This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

Everyday joint remembering, from family remembering around the dinner table to team remembering in the operating theatre, relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales, which we distinguish for analytic purposes so as better to study their interanimation in practice: (i) faster, lower-level coordination processes of behavioral matching and interactional synchrony occurring at (...) timescale t1; (ii) mid-range collaborative processes which re-evoke past experiences in groups, unfolding at timescale t2; (iii) cooperative processes involved in the transmission of memories over longer periods occurring at timescale t3; and (iv) cultural processes and practices operating within distributed socio-cognitive networks over evolutionary and historical timeframes, unfolding at timescale t4. In this paper we survey studies of how the processes operating across these overlapping and complementary timescales constitute joint remembering in social interactions. We describe coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and culture as complementary aspects of interacting to remember, which we consider as a complex phenomenon unfolding over multiple timescales (t1, t2, t3, t4). (shrink)

Everyday joint remembering, from family remembering around the dinner table to team remembering in the operating theatre, relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales, which we distinguish for analytic purposes so as better to study their interanimation in practice: faster, lower-levelcoordination processesof behavioral matching and interactional synchrony occurring at timescale t1; mid-rangecollaborative (...) processeswhich re-evoke past experiences in groups, unfolding at timescale t2; cooperative processesinvolved in the transmission of memories over longer periods occurring at timescale t3; and cultural processesand practices operating within distributed socio-cognitive networks over evolutionary and historical timeframes, unfolding at timescale t4. In this paper we survey studies of how the processes operating across these overlapping and complementary timescales constitute joint remembering in social interactions. We describe coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and culture as complementary aspects of interacting to remember, which we consider as a complex phenomenon unfolding over multiple timescales. (shrink)

The discussion of whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their behaviour has long taken place in philosophy. In recent years this has moved into scientific and psychiatric investigation. Responsibility and Psychopathy discusses this subject from both the philosophical and scientific disciplines, as well as a legal perspective.

How psychopaths and their capacity for moral action are viewed is not only philosophically interesting but is also important and relevant for policy. The philosophical discussion of psychopathy has focussed upon the psychological faculties that are prerequisites for moral responsibility and empirical findings regarding psychopathy that are relevant to philosophical accounts of moral understanding and motivation. However, there are legitimate worries about whether psychopathy is a robust scientific construct, and there are risks attached to reifying psychopathy or other psychiatric constructs. (...) We defend the concept of psychopathy by pointing out the relevance of empirical studies about it for our ordinary practices of ascribing moral responsibility and folk psychological accounts of moral understanding and motivation. (shrink)

Psychopaths have emotional and rational impairments that can be expressed in persistent criminal behaviour. UK and US law has not traditionally excused disordered individuals for their crimes citing these impairments as a cause for their criminal behaviour. Until now, the discussion of whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their behaviour has usually taken place in the realm of philosophy. However, in recent years, this debate has been informed by scientific and psychiatric advancements, fundamentally so with the development of Robert Hare's (...) diagnostic tool, the Psychopathy Checklist. Responsibility and Psychopathy explores the moral responsibility of psychopaths. It engages with problems at the interface between law, psychiatry, and philosophy, and is divided into three parts offering relevant interdisciplinary background information to address this main problem. The first part discusses the public policy and legal responses to psychopathy. It offers an introduction to the central practical issue of how public policy should respond to psychopathy, providing insights for those arguing about the responsibility of psychopaths. The second part introduces recent scientific advancements in the classification, description, explanation, and treatment of psychopathy. The third part of the volume includes chapters covering the most significant dimensions of philosophical debate on the moral and criminal responsibility of psychopaths. (shrink)

This book explains the ethical and conceptual tensions in the use of psychopathy in different countries, including America, Canada, the UK, Croatia, Australia, and New Zealand. It offers an extensive critical analysis of how psychopathy functions within institutional and social contexts. Inside, readers will find innovative interdisciplinary analysis, written by leading international experts. The chapters explore how different countries have used this diagnosis. A central concern is whether psychopathy is a mental disorder, and this has a bearing upon whether it (...) should be used. The book’s case studies will help readers understand the problems associated with psychopathy. Academics and students working in the philosophy of psychiatry, bioethics, and moral psychology will find it a valuable resource. In addition, it will also appeal to mental health professionals working in forensic settings, psychologists with an interest in the ethical implications of the use of psychopathy as a construct and particularly those with a research interest in it. (shrink)

Joint remembering relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, linguistic, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales which we distinguish for analytic purposes with the terms ‘coordination’, ‘collaboration’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘culture’, so as better to study their interanimation in practice. As an illustrative example of the complementary timescales involved in joint remembering in a real-world activity, we present a (...) micro-qualitative analysis of an interactional sequence in which two members of a fourperson team of video designers crafted a memory- scaffolding tool. In order to find the temporal structure of the crafting of the memory-scaffolding tool, we used software for pattern recognition. The analysis suggests that coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and culture reveal complementary aspects of interacting to remember, which should be considered as complex phenomenon unfolding at multiple interanimating timescales. (shrink)

A team of leading contributors from both philosophical and literary backgrounds have been brought together in this impressive book to examine how works of literary fiction can be a source of knowledge. Together, they analyze the important trends in this current popular debate. The innovative feature of this volume is that it mixes work by literary theorists and scholars with work of analytic philosophers that combined together provide a comprehensive statement of the variety of ways in which works of fiction (...) can engage questions of worldly interest. It uses the problem of cognitive value to explore: literature’s contribution to ethical life literature’s ability to engage in social and political critique the role narrative plays in opening up possibilities of moral, aesthetic, experience and selfhood This remarkable volume will attract the attention of both literature and philosophy scholars with its statement of the various ways that literature and life take an interest in one another. (shrink)

A team of leading contributors from both philosophical and literary backgrounds have been brought together in this impressive book to examine how works of literary fiction can be a source of knowledge. Together, they analyze the important trends in this current popular debate. The innovative feature of this volume is that it mixes work by literary theorists and scholars with work of analytic philosophers that combined together provide a comprehensive statement of the variety of ways in which works of fiction (...) can engage questions of worldly interest. It uses the problem of cognitive value to explore: literature’s contribution to ethical life literature’s ability to engage in social and political critique the role narrative plays in opening up possibilities of moral, aesthetic, experience and selfhood This remarkable volume will attract the attention of both literature and philosophy scholars with its statement of the various ways that literature and life take an interest in one another. (shrink)

“Pale Blue Dot” and “Anthropocene” are common tropes in astrobiology and often appear in ethical arguments. Both support a decentering of human life relative to biological life in terms of value. This article introduces a typology of life-value narratives: hierarchical narratives with human life above other life and holistic narratives with human life among other life. Astrobiology, through the two tropes, supports holistic narratives, but this should not be viewed as opposed to Christianity. Rather, Christian scriptures provide seeds of both (...) hierarchical and holistic narratives, each of which may flourish in different environments. By attending to which aspects of human life are valued—or disvalued—relative to biological life, we can better understand how life-concepts do work in ethics, anthropology, and soteriology in secular as well as theological contexts. (shrink)

The main aim of this study is to test the validity of the Motivation, Engagement, and Thriving in User Experience model in higher education. We propose a process model in which we investigate how the need-satisfaction of digital learning tools within the interface sphere and task sphere accounts for engagement, learning, and well-being. A total of 426 higher education students drawn from two subsamples participated in this cross-sectional study. A structural equation model shows that interface autonomy and competence satisfaction positively (...) predict task autonomy and competence. Task competence, in turn, negatively predicts focused attention and positively predicts perceived usability and well-being. Task autonomy positively predicts perceived usability and reward. Based on our results, we provide some initial support for the METUX model in higher education. However, more validation work is needed to improve the scale that measures need-satisfaction in the interface and task spheres. Moreover, we find no support for the effect of task sphere on learning. Further investigations are needed into how METUX can be used in domain- and situation-specific contexts to account for increases in engagement, learning, and well-being. Finally, future studies need to include all aspects of the METUX model in order to fully test its validity. (shrink)

In this chapter we argue that Robert Hare's psychopathy checklist revised (PCL-R) offers a construct of psychopathy that is valid enough for philosophical investigations of the moral and legal responsibility of psychopathic offenders.

Responsibility is a key concept in our moral, social, and political thinking, but it is not itself properly understood. J.R. Lucas here presents a lively, broad, and accessible discussion of responsibility in various areas of human life, from personal and sexual relations to politics.

The philosophical contributes in the volume offer several considerations for the conclusion that psychopaths offenders should not be considered morally responsible for their crimes. We situate this conclusion within wider philosophical debates and indicate relevant directions of further research.

This Element offers a framework for exploring the methodological challenges of neuroethics. The aim is to provide a roadmap for the methodological assumptions, and related pitfalls, involved in the interdisciplinary investigation of the ethical and legal implications of neuroscientific research and technology. It illustrates these points via the debate about the ethical and legal responsibility of psychopaths. Argument and the conceptual analysis of normative concepts such as 'personhood' or 'human agency' is central to neuroethics. This Element discusses different approaches to (...) establishing norms and principles that regulate the practices addressed by neuroethics and that involve the use of such concepts. How to characterize the psychological features central to neuroethics, such as autonomy, consent, moral understanding, moral motivation, and control is a methodological challenge. In addition, there are epistemic challenges when determining the validity of neuroscientific evidence. (shrink)

The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He (...) criticizes me both for "failing to notice" that my ability to show that the Gödel sentence of a formal system is true "depends very much on how he is given. (shrink)

PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the general aim of the whole manoeuvre.

David Lewis criticizes an argument I put forward against mechansim on the grounds that I fail to distinguish between OL, Lucas's ordinary potential arithmetic output, and OML, Lucas's arithmetical output when accused of being some particular machine M; and correspondingly, between OM the ordinary potential arithmetic output of the machine M, and ONM, the arithmetic output of the machine M when accused of being a particular machine N. For any given machine, M, N, O, P, Q, R,... etc., (...) I can in principle calculate a Godel sentence for that machine - indeed infinitely many, depending on the Godel numbering scheme adopted. The Godel sentence of a particular machine can, I claim, be seen to be true, if that machine is adequate for Elementary Peano Arithmetic. Hence, if I were accused of being M, I can on that supposition see that the Godel sentence of M is true, since I am capable of Elementary Peano Arithmetic and the machine M is said to be an adequate characterization of me. (shrink)

Coder’s argument is very similar to Lewis’ one: he maintains that some human beings are not able to follow Gödel’s theorem, so Lucas’ argument cannot show that their minds are not machines. The answer of Lucas is that one proposed against Lewis’ criticism, that is that Mechanism makes a universal claim and so a single counter-example – a single mind producing a singe truth not recognizable by any machine – is a disproof for it.

We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for (...) the `mentalist' to argue that any given program can always be improves since the process for improving programs can presumably be programmed also; certainly this can be done if the mentalist describes how the improvement is to be made. If he does give such a description, then he has not made a case. (shrink)

The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics is a comprehensive study of the foundation of mathematics. Lucas, one of the most distinguished Oxford scholars, covers a vast amount of ground in the philosophy of mathematics, showing us that it is actually at the heart of the study of epistemology and metaphysics.

In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition nor Penrose’s one, so they seek to refute arguments they never proposed. Therefore he offers a brief history of the Gödelian argument put forward by Gödel, Penrose and Lucas itself: Gödel argued indeed that either mathematics is incompletable – that is axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule and so human mind surpasses the power of any finite machine – (...) or there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems, and he suggest that the second disjunct is untenable; on the other side, Penrose proposed an argument similar to Lucas’ one but making use of Turing’s theorem. Finally Lucas exposes again his argument and considers some of the most important objections to it. (shrink)

Lucas introduces this paper by an account of how he began to be interested to questions about Materialism and Mechanism. Then he suggests a simple version of the Incompleteness theorem of Gödel, showing how this theorem proposes a version of the Epimenides’ paradox able to avoid the circularity of this paradox by means of the possibility to express meta-mathematics in terms of arithmetical propositions and by substituting questions concerning truth by questions concerning provability.

Two questions are distinguished: how to program a machine so that it behaves in a manner that would lead us to ascribe consciousness to it; and what is involved in saying that something is conscious. The distinction can be seen in cases where anaesthetics have failed to work on patients temporarily paralysed.

Benacerraf criticizes Lucas’ argument against Mechanism because, in his opinion, it depends too much on how the system we are talking about is presented and because the argument put in form of challenge reduces itself to a contest of wits between Lucas and the mechanists. In Benacerraf opinion, Lucas should clarify the sense of utilised notions and the argument would have to be reconstructed as formally as possible, in order to determine the involved philosophical premises. Moreover Benacerraf (...) maintains that, instead of abandoning the idea that human mind is a machine, we could assume that minds are machines for which it is not possible to prove the consistency or that they are inadequate for arithmetic; moreover minds could be machines whose characteristics we are not able to specify. However, Lucas answers that the requirement of reconstructing his argument in a formal way misunderstands his project: his argument is not a direct proof but a dialectical argument, a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanist argument, and so the attempt to reconstruct it as a rigorous proof is a distortion of the original argument, that is essentially dialectical. What about the hypothesis suggested by Benacerraf, Lucas disputes that we are able to manage arithmetic and we don’t seem as inconsistent as an inconsistent system is, because we are selective while an inconsistent system is not; at the other hand, the idea that we are machine but we don’t know anything about what kind of machine we are evacuates Mechanism of all content. (shrink)

These two articles are very interesting examples of how Lucas’ argument is not a direct proof but a dialectical argument depending from Mechanists’ first move. Good, starting from the Mentalists’ point of view, underlines that it is useless to argue that any program can be improved because the process for improving it can be programmed; he argues against Mentalism by denying that there are particular mental powers, because otherwise they could be described and so a computer could be programmed (...) to simulate them. The Lucas’ answer is constituted by a starting point’s change: his starting point is indeed the hypothesis that Mechanism is true and so that a complete specification of the mental mechanism of any human being can be given; therefore he argues that, once given, such a specification appears inadequate because it cannot produce as true its Gödelian formula, truth that a human being can see. (shrink)

Hutton asserts that Lucas’ use of Gödel’s theorem against Mechanism is incorrect because of the impossibility to assume human minds’ consistency: he tries to show that there is a non-zero probability of a mind’s embracing mutually inconsistent propositions; moreover Hutton maintains that the request of human minds’ consistency is a request of infallibility. Lucas replies that the mistake of Hutton’s argument consists in his assigning probabilities to a mind’s accepting any proposition without considering what that mind has done (...) hitherto, while human beings are guided in their accepting a proposition as true by what they have already accepted. Besides, Lucas argues that his argument doesn’t require human infallibility but only that human beings have adequate backing for what they assert and that – in this sense – consistency is not something that can be established but a necessary assumption to begin any thinking at all. (shrink)

Responsibility is a key concept in our moral, social, and political thinking, but it is not itself properly understood. J.R. Lucas here presents a lively, broad, and accessible discussion of responsibility in various areas of human life, from personal and sexual relations to politics.

Hello Mr John Lucas, I go to school in Perth in Western Australia. In the subject mathematics at my school, we were given a project to research a given mathematician and write a report on them. I was given you. I have to incorporate some information about the mathematical times in which you live and to attempt to include details of the contribution that you made to the field of mathematics. I also have to include a short biography (...) of your life. If it is alright with you, would you be able to give me a brief biography of your life and a very brief summary of the contributions you have made to the field of mathematics. If it is possible, even the mathematical times in which we live. I hope this is not too much trouble and if you could, would you be able to e-mail it to me as soon as possible please since we don't have long to finish the project. Please e-mail it back to me on my dad's address above. I hope this is not a bother to you. Remember, I am only a high school student and I might not understand all that you hopefully send. Thankyou very much. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism engages our interest and sympathy because it is flawed. It reflects the crisis in Mill’s life, when he lost his faith. He had been brought up by his father in the straitest tenets of utilitarianism, but had had nervous breakdown in early adult life from emotional ill-nourishment. Utilitarianism might work as a guide for the well-governing of India by James Mill and his colleagues, but gave little sustenance to the aspiring spirit of the Romantic Movement. (...) It treats people as units, not individuals. It takes no account of the “projects” that people pursue, as Bernard Williams.. (shrink)

_The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics_ is a comprehensive study of the foundation of mathematics. J.R. Lucas, one of the most distinguished Oxford scholars, covers a vast amount of ground in the philosophy of mathematics, showing us that it is actually at the heart of the study of epistemology and metaphysics.

The views of Redhead ([2004]) are defended against the argument by Panu Raatikainen ([2005]). The importance of informal rigour is canvassed, and the argument for the a priori nature of induction is explained. The significance of Gödel's theorem is again rehearsed.

Introductions should introduce, but sometimes lead to engagements. That is our aim. We want to make Plato’s Republic more easily read by modern readers, but do not want to do only that. For philosophy is like poetry, and cannot be learned second-hand. I can learn all sorts of facts about a poem, but unless I have entered into the poet’s experience, if only in my imagination, it remains dead. Similarly, I shall not see the point of text-book analyses of philosophical (...) doctrines unless I have felt the force of the arguments that led the philosopher to propose them, and have some sense of the objections he encountered and the way he sought to surmount them. That is why we still need to read Plato and Aristotle, as we do Homer and Sophocles, in a way that we do not, save as a historical exercise, read ancient textbooks of medicine or mechanical construction. (shrink)

Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the (...) latter approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention. (shrink)

The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider when reflecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explanation. Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” or (...) “stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any specific context varies. -/- In the following, we first offer a historiographical note on the synthesis. Second, we introduce five ways in which synthesis authors spoke about chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible ways in which chance meaningfully figures in explanations in evolutionary biology. These are simply five common uses of the term by biologists at this period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions: • What did synthesis authors understand by chance? • How did these authors see chance operating in evolution? • Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the synthesis? That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed (1983)? (shrink)

Trata do caráter objetivo dos juízos morais a partir da proposta ética de John Rawls. Inicialmente, apresenta a discussão acerca da objetividade dos juízos morais como uma questão relevante do discurso metaético contemporâneo. Em seguida, apresenta o equilíbrio reflexivo, ponto de sustentação dos juízos morais na teoria ética de John Rawls, como procedimento adequado no estabelecimento das bases para uma sociedade bem ordenada. Por fim, explicita como o equilíbrio reflexivo pode garantir objetividade aos juízos e à normatividade morais, (...) sem recorrer ao realismo moral como fundamentação dos mesmos.: It comes to the objective character of moral judgments from the ethics proposed by John Rawls. Initially presents a discussion about the objectivity of moral judgments as an issue of contemporary metaethical discourse. It then presents the reflective equilibrium, support point of moral judgments in ethical theory of John Rawls, as proper procedure in establishing the foundations for a well-ordered society. Finally, it states as reflective equilibrium can ensure objectivity to the moral judgments and normativity without resorting to moral realism as justification for the same. Keywords : Metaethics. Moral objectivity. Moral realism. Moral judgments. Reflective equilibrium. Constructivism. (shrink)